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PUTTING THE CARTWAY BEFORE THE HOUSE:
STATUTORY EASEMENTS BY NECESSITY, OR CARTWAYS,
IN NORTH CAROLINA
JOSEPHJ. KALO"
MONICA KIVEL KALO*"
For almost two hundred years, North Carolina has had "cartway"
legislation that allows owners of certain landlocked parcels of
land to gain access to a public road. However, because the
creation of a cartway utilizes the state's power of eminent domain,
the situations in which cartways are allowed historically have
been limited. In response to the legislature's temporary
broadening of the cartway statute in 1995, Professors Joseph and
Monica Kalo examine the history and rationale of the cartway in
North Carolina and argue that the statute's application should
remain limited and that further efforts to broaden the statute
should be discouraged.
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On occasion, both in the past and present, title to land has
become subdivided in such a manner as to leave some portion of it
without an express or implied easement or other right of way to the
public road system. To ensure that such land does not remain
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involuntarily unused or unproductive, most states enacted statutes
allowing the landlocked landowner to petition the courts for the
creation of a statutory easement by necessity, or as it is sometimes
termed, a statutory cartway.1 The person whose land will be
burdened by the cartway is entitled to reasonable compensation paid
by the petitioner.! In effect, a cartway statute delegates the right to
use the state's power of eminent domain to a private person or
entity.4
Although there has been cartway legislation in North Carolina
since 1798, North Carolina has amended its cartway statute' many
times during the past two hundred years to meet evolving economic
conditions and changing public policy considerations. Most recently,
during the 1995 legislative session, the General Assembly amended
the cartway statute and expanded its scope. However, embodied
within the amendments was a "sunset provision" that provided an
expiration date of July 1, 1997. After that date, the cartway statute
was to revert to its pre-1995 form Although the 1995 amendments
1. See, e.g., 2A JuIuus L SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 7.07[4][i][1]
(rev. 3d ed. 1997). In some states, constitutional amendments were necessary as well. See
2A Ua I 7.07[4][i][/ij.
2. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(a) (Supp. 1996); JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND 4.02[4] (rev. ed. 1995).
3. The term "cartway" instead of "statutory easement" will be used in this Article
because, historically, "cartway" has been the preferred term.
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-68 (Supp. 1996) ("The procedure established under
Chapter 40A, entitled 'Eminent Domain,' shall be followed ... insofar as the same is
applicable and in harmony with the provisions of this section."); 2A SACKMAN, supra note
1, 7.07[4][i][].
5. The current version of the statute is found at N.C. GEN. STAT. H9 136-68 to -70
(Supp. 1996). In this Article these three sections will be referred to as the "cartway
statute" except where a distinction is being made among them.
6. There is an argument that all of the substantive provisions of the cartway statute
disappear on July 1, 1997. The Act that was actually passed by the General Assembly and
signed into law contains five sections: 1, 2, 3, 3a, and 4. The first, Section 1, states that
§ 136-68 of the General Statutes (a procedural section) reads as rewritten. This section is
followed by a rewritten § 136-68, which includes within its body the 1995 amendments,
which are underlined. The next, Section 2, consists of § 136-69 (the heart of the cartway
statute), as rewritten, with the 1995 amendments underlined as well. Section 3 consists of
§ 136-70 (alteration or abandonment of cartways) as rewritten. Section 3a directs that the
compensation to the landowner for the establishment of a cartway shall be as provided in
Chapter 40A, Article 4 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Then Section 4 states:
"This act is effective upon ratification but sections 2 and 3 shall expire on July 1, 1997," not
that the amendments to §§ 136-69 and 136-70 shall expire on July 1, 1997. Act of July 29,
1995, ch. 513,1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1823, 1823-25 (emphasis added) (codified as revised at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-68 to -70 (Supp. 1996)). If Section 4 is read as it is actually
written, there would be no cartway statute after July 1, 1997 because Section 3 (§ 136-69)
is the part of the statute that sets forth the grounds upon which a cartway may be imposed
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technically are not applicable to post-July 1, 1997 cartway
proceedings, the nature of the 1995 amendments raises important
questions about the present scope of the statute and its future
direction, questions that it is hoped the North Carolina General
Assembly will consider when it revisits the cartway statute, as it
inevitably will.'
This revisitation will occur because, as this Article will explain,
there are constant pressures to expand the scope of the statute. One
illustration of those pressures is the enactment of the 1995
amendments themselves. While the pre-1995 statute did not
authorize the establishment of a cartway for land devoted exclusively
to residential use,8 the 1995 amendments extended the right to
petition for a cartway to landowners lacking a documented or
recorded easement or right of way to a public road when the land
was to be used solely for a single-family homestead of at least seven
acres.9  These and other carefully tailored aspects of the 1995
amendments strongly suggest that the amendments were designed to
benefit somebody's constituent.10 With the demise of the 1995
on another landowner's land and the procedures to follow in doing so. However, the
Revisor of Statutes, after consultation with the General Statutes Commission, determined
that the General Assembly did not intend that the act actually be read literally.
Consequently, when the act was codified in the General Statutes, the Revisor of Statutes
directed that there should be two versions of §§ 136-69 and 136-70 published. The first
version, effective until July 1, 1997, contains the 1995 amendments. The second version,
effective after July 1, 1997, contains §§ 136-69 and 136-70 as these sections existed before
the passage of the 1995 legislation. In codifying the acts passed by the General Assembly,
the Revisor makes technical changes, after consultation with the General Statutes
Commission. The question is whether the change that was made is within the authority
granted to the Revisor and the General Statutes Commission. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 114-9.1, 114-9(3)(c) (1994); iU. § 164-13(a) (1993).
7. In fact, as this article was being edited, two attempts were made in the 1997
General Assembly to further amend the cartway statute. House Bill 501-A Bill To Be
Entitled An Act To Amend The Laws Relating To The Opening Of Cartways-proposed a
reduction of the acreage requirement for qualifying homesteads from seven acres to two.
Senate Bill 456-A Bill To Be Entitled An Act To Remove The Sunset From The 1995
Amendments To The Laws Providing For The Establishment Of Cartways-proposed a
removal of the 1995 sunset provision. Neither bill was enacted into law.
8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69 (1993) (amended 1995).
9. See id. § 136-69(a) (Supp. 1996).
10. Although the 1995 minutes of the Senate Judiciary II/Elections Law Committee do
not contain any explanation of the legislation amending the cartway statute, the narrow,
carefully tailored language of the amendments is strong circumstantial evidence that it was
designed to solve a particular individual's problem. The primary change was to allow
acquisition of a cartway to access a "singie-family homestead ... consist[ing] of at least
seven acres." Id. Why was the change limited to "seven acres" and not some other
acreage? Why not cover any residential use or any single-family homestead? Why did the
amendment expire in less than two years? The legislation was signed on July 29, 1995, and
the changes applied only to petitions for a cartway filed on or after July 29, 1995, but
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amendments, it seems inevitable that other owners of landlocked
parcels who seek to make uses of land not included within the
present cartway provisions will pressure legislators to include their
proposed uses within the ambit of the statute. But before the
General Assembly engages in additional ad hoe, band-aid
modifications of the cartway statute, perhaps some thought should
be given to the present nature of the cartway, the reasons for past
limitations on the scope of the cartway statute, and what
circumstances must exist before a cartway can be established under
the current legislation. This Article hopefully will assist in that
process.
The first section of the Article discusses the constitutional
underpinnings of the cartway statutes and the related question of
whether, once established, a cartway constitutes a private or a public
way.1 The second section discusses what land uses should justify the
imposition of a cartway.'2 The final section discusses what showing
of need for the cartway must be made by the petitioning landowner.'
At the core of all the cartway discussions is the fundamental question
of what circumstances justify using the state's power of eminent
domain to impose a burden on another person's land.
I. CARTWAYS: PRIVATE OR PUBLIC WAYS?
Historically, the cartway statute's invocation of the power of
eminent domain was grounded in the fact that, once established, a
cartway was a quasi-public road that was generally open to public
use and not a private way reserved for the sole and exclusive use of
the petitioner, his business invitees, and guests. 4 Although it was
before July 1, 1997. A logical response is that someone's constituent-someone with a
single-family homestead sitting on at least seven acres-had an access problem, was not
eligible for a cartway under the then-existing law, and persuaded his or her legislator to
put through an amendment. The less-than-two-year limit on the availability of cartways
for this purpose suggests that there was a willingness to allow the needs of someone to be
satisfied, but sufficient doubt as to the wisdom of the change that the committee and
General Assembly were not willing to give it a longer life than necessary. When the bill
was first introduced, the sunset provision was not in it. See H. 545, 1995 N.C. General
Assembly, Regular Sess. 1995 (version dated March 27,1995).
11. See infra notes 14-48 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 49-98 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 99-144 and accompanying text.
14. The constitutionality of the use of the state's power of eminent domain to establish
cartways or, as they are also known, statutory easements by necessity, has long been a
subject of debate. In some states, the courts determined it was constitutional to allow the
use of the state's power of eminent domain to establish a private road to connect
landlocked property to the nearest public road. See 2A SACKMAN, supra note 1,
7.07[4][i][t]. However, in a number of other states, the courts held that such a use of the
1946 [Vol. 75
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created at the initiation of a private party, paid for by the private
party, maintained by the private party, and provided a significant
private benefit, it was the public's right to use the cartway for access
to and from the landlocked parcel that justified this taking of one
person's land to provide access to the lands of another person.
At first glance, § 136-69 of the North Carolina General Statutes
appears to authorize the condemnation of a person's' property to
establish a road for the petitioner's private use by providing that a
cartway is to be laid off when it appears to the court "necessary,
reasonable and just that [the petitioner] shall have a private way to a
public road ... over the lands of other persons."16 However, when
this provision is read in its historical and interpretative context, the
quasi-public character of a statutory cartway remains undisturbed.
"Private way" should be read as simply a grammatical device to
distinguish statutory cartways from public roads established and
maintained by public authorities.
Our cartway legislation dates back to the earliest days of the
state. The first cartway legislation was enacted in 1798,' when there
were few public roads and the state lacked the fiscal resources to
construct an adequate public road infrastructure."8 As evidenced
power of eminent domain was unconstitutional on the basis that it was not for a public use.
See id. These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id Some states have amended their constitutions to allow
such a use of the eminent domain power (Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, lorida, Georgia,
Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, .Oregon,
Washington, and Wyoming). See id. 7.07[4][i][11]. "The justification ... , however, was
not simply [the] convenience of the owner, but some necessity, including the transportation
of products ... to market." Id. (footnotes omitted). In some states, such as North
Carolina, courts have held cartway statutes to be constitutional because such roads are
private in name only. See Cozard v. Hardwood Co., 139 N.C. 283,287-88,51 S.E. 932, 934
(1905); 2A SACKMAN, supra note 1, 7.07[4][i][i]. The United States Supreme Court has
not addressed this constitutional issue. See 2A SACKMAN, supra note 1, 7.07[4][i][ii].
15. In Davis v. Forsyth County, 117 N.C. App. 725, 453 S.E.2d 231 (1995), the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that the cartway statute could be invoked to establish a
cartway over land owned by a county. See id. at 727, 453 S.E.2d at 232.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(a) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
17. See Act of 1798, ch. 26, § 1, 1798 N.C. Sess. Laws 126, 126.
18. See HUGH T. LEFLER & ALBERT RAY NEWSOME, JR., NORTH CAROLINA:
HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY, GOVERNMENT 213, 218, 347 (1959) (stating that although there
was an economic need for good roads, the state was unwilling to tax and spend to improve
the road system); ISAAC LIPPINCOTr, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
238-41 (3d ed. 1933) (noting the lack of good roads in the United States); REGINALD C.
MCGRANE, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN NATION 62, 167-68
(1942) (describing the poor condition of roads in the United States); see also S.
HUNTINGTON HOBBS, JR., NORTH CAROLINA: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROFILE 133
(1958) (observing that sectional politics also played a role in the lack of road construction
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both by the title of the Act and its specific language, the objective of
the 1798 legislation was to supplement the limited public funds
available for road construction with private funds by allowing
persons without access to a public road to acquire a cartway to the
public road, which then became part of the larger system of roads
available for use by the public. Entitled in relevant part "An act to
amend an act entitled 'An act to empower the several County Courts
of Pleas and Quarter-Sessions of the several counties in this state, to
order the laying out [of] public roads,' ,, 9 the 1798 Act expressly
stated that the cartways to be established under it were to be "kept
open for the free passage of persons on horse-back, carts and
[wagons]."2  Through numerous amendments of the cartway
legislation from 1821 to 1938,21 this language remained an integral
part of the cartway statute, infusing it with a public character.
Between 1798 and 1931, the only change to this language in this
section of the cartway statute was expansive in nature, with "persons
on foot" being specifically included in 1854.'
The phrase "private way" first appeared in 1883.' At the same
in North Carolina). Until the 20th century, the main source of state revenues was the
property tax. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRiEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 567(2d ed. 1985). In fact, for many years North Carolina citizens, unless exempt, could be
ordered to work on public roads. See, e.g., Act of 1798, ch. 26, § 1,1798 N.C. Sess. Laws at
127.
19. Act of 1798, ch. 26, preamble, 1798 N.C. Sess. Laws at 126.
20. Id. § 1,1798 N.C. Sess. Laws at 126.
21. The deletion of the language in 1938 does not affect the public character of a
cartway for the reasons discussed in this section of the Article.
22. See CODE OF N.C., ch. 101, § 37 (recorded in REVISED CODE OF N.C., Moore-
Biggs 1854).
23. See CODE OF N.C., vol. I, ch. 50, § 2056 (1883). The identification of cartways
with "private ways" began in 1883 and in fact may have been predicated on the
subsequently repudiated view that the power of eminent domain could be invoked to allow
one individual to condemn a purely private way across another person's land. In the 1857
case of Jacocks v. Newby, 49 N.C. 266 (1857), the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld,
over the objection of a person using the cartway, the right of the defendant-a person for
whose benefit a cartway had been established-to close the cartway when he acquired the
lands over which the cartway passed. See id. at 269-70. In Newby, the court gave a limited
construction to the words "'shall be free for the passage of any person, or persons.'" Id.
at 269 (quoting CODE OFN.C., ch. 104, § 35 (recorded in REVISED STATUTmS OFN.C. vol.
I, 1836-37)). According to the court, the intent of the legislature was to give certain
persons, with no convenient way to and from markets and other places, the means to reach
such places. See id. Such purpose, the court said,
would not be fully accomplished without giving to others, besides the [cartway
petitioner], the right of passing over the cart, or wagon-way. He might wish to
buy as well as sell, and to be visited as well as to visit, and he would often be put
to serious inconvenience if other persons could not come to his land ... without
being guilty of a trespass.... [I]t was his interest alone which the law-makers had
mainly, if not altogether, in view; because the way was to be opened, and kept
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open, at his sole expense ....
Id. Thus, when the defendant acquired the lands over which the cartway passed, the right
to use it was extinguished as to all other persons. See id. Although the result in Newby
was correct on its facts, the court's interpretation of the law appears historically inaccurate
and its implication that a cartway is a purely private way subsequently was repudiated.
First, in Newby, the defendant had acquired a cartway over two neighboring parcels.
See id. at 267. When he opened the cartway, upon reaching his land, he extended it for his
own convenience across his land to a point where it reached the land of his neighbor, the
plaintiff, who took advantage of the road for his own use. See id. The neighbor had
another means of access to a public road, but it was considerably less convenient, and thus
the neighbor objected when the defendant closed the cartway after acquiring the parcels
over which it ran. See iU On these facts, the cartway existed only over the two
neighboring lands over which it passed. There was no cartway on the defendant's land
since one does not have a cartway established over one's own land. The cartway ended
when it reached defendant's land. The cartway was not the road as extended by the
defendant. If the plaintiff had a right to cross defendant's land, it appears to have been a
purely permissive one. Thus, if plaintiff's access to the public road was being cut off by the
defendant's closing a permissive way across defendant's land, the plaintiff really had no
legal grounds upon which to object.
Second, as the court pointed out, at the time the lawsuit was filed, no statutory
provision existed for terminating a cartway. See id. at 269. Procedures were available to
alter or discontinue a public road, but not a cartway. See id. Not allowing the defendant to
discontinue the cartway would mean that the public had a greater interest in a cartway
than it had in a public road. See id. Furthermore, since no one else would be served by the
cartway once defendant acquired the neighboring parcels, it really made no sense for this
cartway as such to continue to exist. See id.
During the pendency of the Newby litigation, the statutory deficiency was remedied
and a provision added giving a public authority the right to discontinue cartways. See id. at
269; CODE OF N.C., ch. 101, § 38 (recorded in REVISED CODE OF N.C., Moore-Biggs
1854). Implicit in this addition to the statutes, an addition that continues today, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 136-70 (Supp. 1996), is the recognition that there are interests, in addition to
those of the person for whose benefit a cartway was established, that must be taken into
account before a cartway may be discontinued. This does not mean the result would be
any different today on the Newby facts; but if, for example, others gain legitimate means
of access to a cartway, then it may be in the public interest to continue the cartway despite
the contrary wishes of the person for whom it was originally established and even if the
other people have other means of access to a public road.
Third, the court's interpretation of the "free passage" language is questionable. See
Newby, 49 N.C. at 268 (opining that a cartway is primarily for the use of the petitioner and
the "free passage of any persons" language refers to use by the petitioner's guests and
business invitees). The historical circumstances necessitating the creation of a statutory
cartway and its placement in the provisions authorizing the county courts to lay out public
roads strongly suggest that the legislature had more in mind than just the interest of the
owner of the landlocked parcel. It is unlikely that the free passage language was included
simply to ensure that the guests and business invitees of the person for whose benefit the
cartway was established could travel the road. More likely is the view that others would
connect to such privately built cartways and use them. Such cartways would then expand
the road system of the state.
Finally, the Newby case was decided without any consideration of the relationship of
the nature of the way established to the right to use the power of eminent domain to
establish it. When the North Carolina Supreme Court faced this question directly, it
reached a conclusion directly contrary to Newby. See Cozard v. Hardwood Co., 139 N.C.
283, 297, 51 S.E. 932, 937 (1905); infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (discussing
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time, any specific reference to the right of the public to use a
statutory cartway disappeared. But even in the absence of this
language, the North Carolina Supreme Court continued to
characterize cartways as quasi-public roads. For example, in Parsons
v. Wright,' the court unequivocally stated that
[c]artways are public roads in the sense that they are open to
all who see fit to use them .... The term is used merely for
the purpose of classification and to distinguish a class of
roads benefiting private individuals who, instead of the
public at large, should bear the expense of their
establishment and maintenance.... They are properly
considered an auxiliary part of the public road system ...
although they are distinguished from public highways
proper.,
Such has been a consistent interpretation of the cartway
statute.6
Furthermore, as a matter of North Carolina constitutional law,
when a cartway is established through the condemnation of private
property using the state's power of eminent domain, the way must be
open for general public use and cannot be solely for the private use
of the party initiating the cartway condemnation proceeding. As
discussed below, this view has long been the unequivocal position of
the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The constitutional issue was first addressed in Cozard v.
Hardwood Co.,' a 1905 case. Cozard was an action for a temporary
restraining order to prevent the defendants from threatening to
invoke the cartway statute to enable them to put a railway through
Cozard).
24. 223 N.C. 520,27 S.E.2d 534 (1943).
25. Id. at 521-22,27 S.E.2d at 536-37 (emphasis added).
26. In Taylor v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 262 N.C. 452, 137 S.E.2d 833 (1964),
the court held that the petitioner was not entitled to a cartway. See id. at 457, 127 S.E.2d
at 837. In the cartway proceeding, the petitioner requested that the sought-after cartway
be established over an existing road on the respondent's land. In discussing that aspect of
the case, Justice Sharp noted that, even if petitioner had been entitled to a cartway, the
respondent's existing private road could serve as the cartway only if it were the only
avenue over respondent's land that could serve as reasonable access to petitioner's land.
See id. at 456-57, 137 S.E.2d at 836. Justice Sharp noted that use of the road by petitioner
as a cartway "would increase both maintenance and supervision costs for respondent (pulp
and paper company) and, once established as a cartway for petitioner's use, it would also
become a quasi-public road." Id. at 456, 137 S.E.2d at 836 (emphasis added); see also
Waldroup v. Ferguson, 213 N.C. 198, 201, 195 S.E. 615, 617 (1938) (noting that cartways
are quasi-public roads intended "to some extent for the use of the public").
27. 139 N.C. 283, 51 S.E. 932 (1905) (appearing in the South Eastern Reporter as
Cozad v. Kanawha Hardwood Co.).
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plaintiff's lands.' The defendants proposed "to construct and use
the [railway] for their sole and exclusive use in removing their timber
and timber products from their lands ... to the railroad station at
Andrews and to the markets."' Despite the defendants' thoroughly
modem public policy arguments about the importance of the timber
industry to the economy of western North Carolina and the necessity
of such private roads for the exploitation of timber, the court held
that the use of the power of eminent domain for the purpose of
establishing such a private road for the defendants was
unconstitutional." In explaining its decision, the court stated:
"It has never, we think, been decided in any case that
private property could be condemned for a private road for
the exclusive use of the applicant, and we know of no
principle upon which such a proceeding can be justified."
... [The defendants] invite [the] courts to find in the
term "public use" a broader and larger meaning.... [G]reat
and dangerous monopolies have been fostered by the
liberal construction put upon the term "public use." It has
sometimes happened that a stubborn and possibly
sentimental owner of land has stood in the way of the
development of the country and of the impatient, strenuous
promoter and industrial pioneer. It may be that his rights
have not received ... in the Legislature ... the
consideration to which they were entitled.
... [W]e are urged to announce a broad and
statesmanlike principle in determining this question, and
one which would further business prosperity of the State,
rather than one which would hamper and retard it. ... To
the argument that a liberal construction should be given to
[the] term "public use," ... the answer is that "The
Constitution is the fundamental law."'"
28. See id. at 283-84,51 S.E. at 932. By 1905 the cartway statute had been amended to
allow a person who owned standing timber "to which there is leading no public road, or
which is not convenient to water" to have "a private way to a ... railroad over the lands of
other persons." CODE OFN.C., ch. 65, § 2686 (recorded in REvIsAL OF 1905 OFN.C. vol.
1).
29. Cozard, 139 N.C. at 285,51 S.E. at 933.
30. See id. at 297,51 S.E. at 937.
31. Id. at 289-93, 51 S.E. at 934-36 (citations omitted) (quoting 1 JOHN LEWIS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 167, at 428 (2d
ed. 1900)); see also City of Statesville v. Roth, 77 N.C. App. 803, 807, 336 S.E.2d 142, 144
1997] CARWA YS 1951
1952 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
Cases decided subsequent to Cozard have done nothing to
undercut the proposition that a cartway is not "private" in the sense
of a road that is solely for the benefit and use of the petitioner."
Rather, the North Carolina Supreme Court's continued
characterization of cartways as quasi-public means that such roads
are open to the general public. 3
Nonetheless, some may argue that, despite the Cozard opinion,
it is still an open question as to whether today the General Assembly
constitutionally has the power to authorize the use of the power of
eminent domain to establish a purely private way. Constitutional
theory has evolved and what was considered not to be an
appropriate use of the power of eminent domain in 1905 may be
considered to be acceptable in the 1990s. Both federal and state
constitutional standards for making that judgment have expanded.m
Despite these modern, more expansive views, it is submitted that, as
a matter of North Carolina law, the cartway statute still cannot be
used to condemn a purely private way. This conclusion is predicated
on the North Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Carolina
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. McLeod.35
McLeod involved an attempt by the telephone company to use
§ 40A-19 of the North Carolina General Statutes, the statutory
(1985) (presenting a similar holding). In Roth, the city attempted to condemn a portion of
some land for the purpose of constructing and installing water and sewer lines solely for
the benefit of a manufacturing plant located on an adjacent parcel. See Roth, 77 N.C. App.
at 806-07, 336 S.E.2d at 144. The plant could have been reached by a different route,
which crossed other land owned by the owner of the plant or his company, however,
because of the topography, this route was considerably more costly. See id. at 805, 336
S.E.2d at 143. The trial court found that such a use of the power of eminent domain was
unconstitutional, a finding sustained by the court of appeals. See id. at 807, 336 S.E.2d at
144. Before the court of appeals, the city argued that providing such a service to the plant
was a public benefit because the plant would employ 30 people and thus contribute to the
general welfare. See id. The court rejected that argument, stating that "'[t]he home or
other property of a poor man cannot be taken from him by eminent domain and turned
over to the ... wealthy individual or corporation merely because the latter may be
expected to spend more money in the community."' Id. (quoting Highway Comm'n v.
Thornton, 271 N.C. 227,243,156 S.E.2d 248,260 (1967)).
32. See Taylor v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 262 N.C. 452, 456, 137 S.E.2d 833,
836 (1964); Parsons v. Wright, 223 N.C. 520, 521-22, 27 S.E.2d 534, 536-37 (1943);
Waldroup v. Ferguson, 213 N.C. 198,201,195 S.E. 615, 617 (1938).
33. See Waldroup, 213 N.C. at 201,195 S.E. at 617; see also Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
McLeod, 321 N.C. 426,431-34,364 S.E.2d 399,402-04 (1988) (discussing the public benefit
and the characterization of the private use as incidental to the paramount public use).
34. See McLeod, 321 N.C. at 429-30, 364 S.E.2d at 401; see also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984) (holding that the mere fact that property, taken by
the state by eminent domain, is ultimately transferred to private parties does not violate
the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
35. 321 N.C. 426,364 S.E.2d 399 (1988).
provision for private condemnation of privately owned real property,
to acquire an easement over the defendant's land in order to provide
service to a single customer. 6 The defendant asserted that the use of
the statute in such circumstances was not for the statutorily required
"public use or public benefit," a contention the court firmly
rejected.37 In addressing the issue of the proper standard for
determining if the eminent domain power is being used for a "public
use or public benefit," the court identified three different tests,
without settling on any one of them because in the court's view the
use of the power of eminent domain in this instance satisfied each
test. 8
The first test in McLeod was the "public use" test, which asks
"whether the general public has a right to a definite use of the
[condemned] property."3 9 It is the public's right to use, rather than
the public's actual use, that is controlling. According to the court,
that test was satisfied because every member of the public could use
the telephone to reach the person whose telephone was connected to
the line."0 Applying this test to a cartway, it clearly would mean that
the cartway must be available for use by any member of the general
public.
The second test discussed in McLeod was the "public benefit"
test, which asks whether the desired use of the property "would
contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the public at
large."4' According to the court, for a benefit to satisfy this test, the
taking must "'"furnish the public with some necessity or
convenience which cannot readily be furnished without the aid of
some governmental power, and which is required by the public as
such." ' "4 This requirement was satisfied in McLeod because the
provision of telephone service to a single customer helps ensure that
the entire community is interconnected and allows each member to
use the system to reach any other member of the community.' In
the context of a cartway, although the way connects the party for
36. See id. at 426-27, 364 S.E.2d at 399; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-19 (1984)
(granting the power of eminent domain to railroads, public utilities, and similar entities for
the public use or benefit).
37. See McLeod, 321 N.C. at 427, 364 S.E.2d at 399.
38. See id. at 430-34,364 S.E.2d at 401-04.
39. Id. at 430, 364 S.E.2d at 401.
40. See id. at 431, 364 S.E.2d at 402.
41. Id. at 432, 364 S.E.2d at 402.
42. Id. (quoting Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N.C. 750, 755, 40 S.E.2d 600, 604 (1946)
(quoting 18 AM. JUR. Eminent Domain § 38 (1938))).
43. See id. at 432-33,364 S.E.2d at 402-03.
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whose benefit it is established to the public road system, unless the
rest of the community is allowed to use the way, the reciprocal,
mutual benefit that was present in McLeod is not present and the
public benefit test is not satisfied. Of course, if the court accepts the
notion that simply connecting landlocked parcels with a public road
is a sufficient public benefit-a notion rejected by Cozard-then it
would be permissible to condemn one person's land to create a
purely private road for another.
The last test discussed by the McLeod court was whether the
"private use ... is incidental to the paramount public use." Stated
another way, this test asks whether the private use or the public use
is paramount. In that context, the court discussed Highway
Commission v. Asheville School,"5 a 1970 opinion in which the court
upheld the condemnation of land by the highway department to
create a purely private way for a person whose access to a public
road was being cut off by the construction of a new highway.46 In
that situation, the parcel became landlocked as a consequence of the
highway project, and the provision of a new private means of access
was seen as "an incidental part of a comprehensive and complex
highway project of national significance.' 7 In McLeod, the provision
of service to one customer was "a small part of a more important and
more far-reaching effort ... to ensure that, in an era in which the
telephone has truly become a necessity, whole communities, as well
as members of individual communities, are interconnected."4 " In a
cartway proceeding, unless the way is to be open to the public, such
an interconnection is absent and the benefit would be primarily and
paramountly to the person seeking the cartway, and thus an
impermissible exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Even if our court should decide that the use of the power of
eminent domain to condemn a private way is constitutional as a
matter of North Carolina law, such a use is not authorized by the
present statute when viewed in its historical context. Furthermore,
before it takes any steps specifically to authorize the condemnation
of land for a purely private way, the General Assembly should
carefully consider the interests of all who would be affected by such a
change-cartway petitioners, landowners over whose land such a
44. Id. at 433,364 S.E.2d at 403 (citing 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 32 (1966)).
45. 276 N.C. 556,173 S.E.2d 909 (1970).
46. See id. at 563-64,173 S.E.2d at 915.
47. Id. at 562,173 S.E.2d at 914.
48. McLeod, 321 N.C. at 434, 364 S.E.2d at 403.
1954 [Vol. 75
1997] CARTWAYS 1955
way would be imposed, and the general public.
II. SHOULD CARTWAYS BE AVAILABLE TO ANYONE WHO WISHES
TO MAKE ANY LEGITIMATE USE OF A LANDLOCKED PARCEL?
The right to initiate a cartway proceeding is not available to just
any person seeking access to a public road from a landlocked
parcel. 9 Only persons engaged in the following activities may
petition to have a cartway established: (a) "the cultivation of land";
(b) "the cutting and removing of standing timber"; (c) "the operating
of any industrial or manufacturing plants"; (d) "[the operating of]
any public or private cemetery"; and (e) the "taking [of] any action
preparatory to the operation of such enterprises. '
The obvious question is why the cartway statute is so narrowly
drawn. Would it not be more reasonable to amend the statute to
allow any residential use to qualify, or, as was unsuccessfully
attempted in 1985.7 to allow any "owner of real property" to petition
for a cartway? The initial reaction to such proposals for a more
encompassing statute is that they ate reasonable. Indeed, any
objections to such proposals seem especially unwarranted if, as we
submit is the case, once a statutory cartway is opened, its use is not
limited to the use that served as the ground for the cartway but may
49. Historically, the right to initiate a cartway proceeding has not been limited to
owners of the landlocked parcel, but available to any person who uses the land for a
statutorily acceptable purpose. There is a question as to whether the 1995 amendments
changed this historical right because the amended statute begins by stating: "In order to
ensure all landowners who do not have a deeded or documented easement or right-of-way
to a public road shall have a legal means of obtaining access to that road[, they may
petition for a cartway]." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(a) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
This language suggests that only landowners are entitled to file a cartway petition.
However, § 136-69(a) then continues with the traditional language that "any person ...
[who] shall be engaged... [in certain activities] may institute a [cartway] proceeding." Id.
The phrase "any person" has permitted tenants and other users of landlocked parcels, and
not just landowners, to initiate a cartway proceeding. Read in light of the cartway statute's
history, the first part of the amended statute should be construed as simply a statement of
the general legislative purpose that may be effectuated by allowing a cartway proceeding
to be initiated by any person making a statutorily acceptable use of the land.
The beginning clause relating to landowners is subject to the 1995 amendments'
sunset provision and thus will not be part of the statute after July 1, 1997. See id.
Nonetheless, if the statute is amended in the future, care should be taken to avoid similar
construction questions.
50. Id. Included among the acceptable land uses that the 1995 amendments set forth
is the use of land for a single-family homestead comprising seven or more acres of land;
this use will no longer be acceptable after July 1, 1997, due to the 1995 amendments'
sunset provision. See id.
51. See S. 654, 1985 N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. 1985.
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encompass any legitimate purpose. 2 However, we believe that a
careful consideration of all of the relevant public and private
interests supports a more conservative approach to any suggestions
for expansion.
Most of the history of the cartway statute, it is true, is one of
responding to changing economic conditions and new uses of land by
expansion of the circumstances under which a person is entitled to
seek a cartway to a landlocked parcel. Yet, within that history, there
is a balancing of the rights of private property owners, whose land
might be burdened by a cartway, with the needs of landlocked
landowners and the broader public interest in assuring that land does
not remain unused simply due to a lack of access. Landlocked
property owners are never given carte blanche to petition for
cartways.
A. The Historical Development of the Cartway Statute
When the General Assembly first added a provision for
obtaining a statutory cartway in 1798, the state had few public roads
and little in the way of state resources to construct additional roads. 3
Land undoubtedly had been carved up and settled without much
regard to access to the few roads that existed.' According to the
1798 statute, "it frequently happens that persons settle in remote
places, where there is no public road leading to and no way to get to
and from, other than by crossing other persons' lands, and it is not
necessary to establish a public road."55 Allowing private individuals
to condemn, at their own expense, the means of reaching a public
road solved both problems. Quasi-public roads were added to the
52. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
53. See HOBBS, supra note 18, at 131-34 (discussing the inadequacy of the road system
in North Carolina from colonial times to the early 1800s and the role sectional politics
played in defeating efforts to build more, and better, roads); ALBERT RAY NEWSOME &
HUGH TALMAGE LEFLER, THE GROWTH OF NORTH CAROLINA 91-92 (1947) (discussing
the poor quality of roads in colonial North Carolina); see also LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra
note 18, at 45 ("Most travel and trade in early North Carolina was by water, since the
people did not have good roads."); ia at 210, 213 (noting absence of good roads).
54. Because "[m]ost travel and trade in early North Carolina was by water," LEFLER
& NEWSOME, supra note 18, at 45, it would seem logical that a number of people acquiring
land would be more concerned about access to a river, a sound, or other waters than with
whether the acquired land had access to a public road. Cf. id at 45, 68 (noting the heavy
use of waterways for transporting goods). However, both good water routes and adequate
roads were lacking in the western mountain region and in the Piedmont, inhibiting the
economic growth of those regions. See id. at 208-12; see also infra note 86 (discussing how
higher, less arable mountain land might be left without access to a public road).
55. Act of 1798, ch. 26, preamble, 1798 N.C. Sess. Laws 126,126.
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state road system and landlocked parcels made accessible.
In 1798, most settled land probably would have also been in
cultivation; however, some land being cultivated undoubtedly was
separated from the land where the person who cultivated it lived.
Ever protective of private property rights, the courts strictly
construed the statutory right to obtain a cartway 6 Land that was
cultivated but unsettled would not qualify? Consequently, by 1836
the legislature amended the cartway statute to allow any person
"cultivating any land" that lacked access to a public road to petition
for a cartway The statute, as amended, probably addressed most of
the situations that would have arisen in the agricultural communities
that comprised North Carolina during most of the 1800s.59
However, as the economy of the state grew and changed, new
access needs were recognized. By the late 19th century, the timber
industry in the mountains of western North Carolina was booming.
6
With the industry desirous of logging isolated tracts, the legislature
responded to the economics of the times by amending the statute and
56. See Lea v. Johnson, 31 N.C. 15, 19 (1848) ("[I]f we depart from the words [of the
statute], there is no stopping short of an unlimited discretion by which the land of one man
may be taken for the use of another."); see also Caroon v. Doxey, 48 N.C. 23, 24 (1855)
(construing "settled upon" and "cultivation" narrowly).
57. Cf. Caroon, 48 N.C. at 24 (using land as a range for cattle was not construed as
"cultivating" it or being "settled upon" it). Cultivation does not include all agricultural
uses of land. Hog farm operations, cattle raising, and large chicken operations standing by
themselves would not qualify. Cf. id (using land as cattle range is not cultivation).
However, most such activities would probably include some cultivation of the land for
animal feed. Nonetheless, a narrow construction of "cultivating" would provide a
landowner, objecting to a cartway because of the use or proposed use of the land for one of
the above or similar activities, with some leverage in opposing such land uses. See infra
notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
58. See CODE OF N.C., ch. 104, § 33 (recorded in REVIsED STATUTES OF N.C. vol. I,
1836-37).
59. But see Caroon, 48 N.C. at 24 (interpreting "cultivation" narrowly so as not to
include swamp land that was not fenced or cultivated and that petitioner, among others,
used as a range for cattle); supra note 57.
60. After the Civil War, there was a high demand for wood. After the lumber industry
cut through the large forests of the Great Lakes states, attention turned to the southern
and southeastern forests, with extensive cutting in North Carolina beginning after 1880.
See LIPPINCOrF, supra note 18, at 351-52; McGRANE, supra note 18, at 409; HARVEY
PERLOFF Er AL., REGIONS, RESOURCES, AND ECONOMIC GRowTH 135, 215-16 (1960).
By 1910, "more than a fifth of the great Carolina forests had been removed." PERLOFF Er
AL., supra, at 215. The expansion of railroad lines into the forested regions aided in this
development. See LEFLER & NEwsOME, supra note 18, at 342; MCGRANE, supra note 18,
at 409; see also Cozard v. Hardwood Co., 139 N.C. 283,290,51 S.E. 932,935 (1905) (noting
that the party seeking a cartway called to the court's attention the economic benefits of
timbering in western North Carolina).
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allowing any person owning "standing timber"'" to which there was
"not leading a public road" or which was "not convenient to water"62
to petition for a cartway. By the early 1900s, the needs of the mining
and manufacturing industry were added to the statute: in 1917, the
statute was amended to include any person "working any mines or
minerals,"6' and in 1921, the legislature added any person
"conducting ... any industrial or manufacturing establishment or
plant, or taking action looking to the erection, equipment, and
operation of any such establishment or plant."'" Finally, by 1921 the
automobile had arrived and a new and improved state highway
system was being developed. The routes of existing roads were
altered or changed to cross streams, improve grades, go over and
under railroads, and to make other improvements6 One
consequence of this was that many existing passage-ways and
cartways leading to public roads were rendered either less
convenient or impassable. Taking such changing conditions into
account, the statute was again amended6 to provide that "wherever
any private passage-way ... has become practically impassable or
unreasonably inconvenient, a new or improved passage-way or
cartway may be opened."67
Then, almost inexplicably, a more conservative philosophy, one
more protective of individual property rights, appeared in 1931 when
the cartway statute suddenly became more restrictive.6 Gone from
the statute was the provision for "settled" land that had been present
since 1798. Beginning in 1931 and continuing for over sixty years,
61. Act of Feb. 1,1887, ch. 46, § 1,1887 N.C. Sess. Laws 97, 97.
62. Id.
63. Act of Mar. 6,1917, ch. 187, § 1,1917 N.C. Sess. Laws 338,338.
64. Act of Mar. 7,1921, ch. 135, § 1, 1921 N.C. Sess. Laws 395, 395.
65. See Brown v. Mobley, 192 N.C. 470, 474, 135 S.E. 304, 305 (1926) (noting that
these types of changes were necessary to improve roads "to meet the new and changing
conditions").
66. See Act of Dec. 20, 1921, ch. 73, § 2,1921 N.C. Sess. Laws 106,106 (extra session).
According to the court in Brown, this amended provision was to be construed liberally to
provide more convenient access to "farmers and others living off the public highway."
Brown, 192 N.C. at 474,135 S.E. at 305. The court also viewed the liberal construction of
the statute as consistent with the perceived legislative policy of encouraging home-owning
in every way, including the provision of more convenient roads to homes. See Id. at 474,
135 S.E. at 306.
67. Act of Dec. 20,1921, ch. 73, § 2,1921 N.C. Sess. Laws at 106 (extra session).
68. Compare CODE OF N.C., § 3836 (recorded in N.C. CODE OF 1927) (allowing
persons "settled upon" land to petition for a cartway), with Act of May 27, 1931, ch. 448,
§ 1, 1931 N.C. Sess. Laws 760, 760-61 (deleting the "settled upon" language and allowing
only those persons using the land for some type of production to petition for a cartway).
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only land devoted to particular businesses or agricultural uses" that
contributed to economic productivity and generated substantial
traffic could qualify for a cartway.7°  Then, in 1995, the use
requirement was broadened once again, but in a somewhat peculiar
manner. The General Assembly amended the cartway statute to
allow "any person ... engaged in ... the use of land as a single-
family homestead" that "consist[s] of at least seven acres of land" to
petition for an order establishing a cartway.71 The amendment is
peculiar on two counts.7 1 The first is the seven-acre requirement; the
other is that the change was effective only until July 1, 1997. After
that date, no residential use of any type qualifies and only the limited
commercial and agricultural uses that predate the 1995 statute will
suffice.'
B. What Uses Should Qualify Under the Cartway Statute?
The obvious question is why the availability of a statutory
cartway should be limited to these pre-1995 uses. On first
impression, it would seem entirely consistent with the history of the
development of the cartway statute to allow any residential use to
qualify under the statute, rather than limiting it to homesteads that
satisfy an acreage limitation. Permitting residential use to qualify
would appear to harken back to versions of the statute that existed
prior to 1931, all of which allowed a person "settled upon" land and
meeting the other requirements of the statute to petition for the
establishment of a cartway. If for 150 years such a situation justified
the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain, then, arguably,
exercise of the power on the basis of residential use is equally
justifiable today. However, there are considerations that might lead
one to reach a different conclusion.
A major consideration should be the importance to the state of
the proposed use of the petitioner's land. A second consideration
should be the resulting burden on the land upon which the cartway
will be imposed. In earlier times-when the emphasis was on the
settlement of a sparsely populated state, the principal commercial
69. See Act of May 27,1931, ch. 448, § 1, 1931 N.C. Sess. Laws at 760-61.
70. See Brown v. Glass, 229 N.C. 657, 658, 50 S.E.2d 912, 913 (1948) (holding that
mere residential use of land does not qualify under cartway statute).
71. Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 513, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1823, 1823-24 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 136-69(a) (Supp. 1996)).
72. The peculiarity of the amendment strongly suggests that it was made to benefit a
particular constituent of some legislator. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(a).
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use of land was farming, and the state lacked the fiscal resources to
construct an extensive system of public roads-the cartway statute
certainly was good public policy. Without it, the creation of a broad
public road system would have been delayed, people would have
been isolated, crops could not have been brought to markets, and
economic development of land lacking access to public roads would
have been significantly impeded. Furthermore, the character and
amount of traffic over a cartway in those earlier times was unlikely to
disturb the privacy, peace, and tranquillity of the burdened farmland,
and so resulted in only a slight burden on an unwilling landowner.
When the growth of the state's timber industry occurred in the
late nineteenth century, especially in the heavily forested western
part of the state, the lack of an extensive system of public roads in
the mountains of North Carolina necessarily meant that many of the
large tracts of timber that were suitable for harvest lacked access to
public roads and, thus, to mills and markets. 4 Not surprisingly, the
state took steps to encourage the industry, both in the courts and the
legislature. One means of access to mills and markets was the rivers
of the western part of the state. Thus, it is not surprising that the
North Carolina Supreme Court declared that if logs could be floated
down a river, the rivers were public, navigable waters that were open
to all, especially the timber industry." On the legislative side, the
cartway statute was amended to include the harvesting of timber.76
Again, this was sound public policy that promoted the development
of an industry important to the state and the full utilization of natural
resources, and that assured that land was not forced to remain
unproductive simply by reason of a lack of access to the public road
system of the state.
Although the amount of traffic, type of equipment, and numbers
of people necessary to remove timber made the potential burden on
unwilling landowners more substantial than the burden imposed
under earlier cartway legislation, there were two ameliorating
74. See infra note 86 (discussing why a legal means of access to a public road was
lacking); see also HOBBS, supra note 18, at 134-35 (noting lack of adequate roads across
the state); LI.EFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 18, at 342, 364 (describing poor condition of
roads).
75. See, e.g., Commissioners of Burke County v. Catawba Lumber Co., 116 N.C. 731,
732, 744, 21 S.E. 941, 942, 946 (1895); Gwaltney v. Scottish Carolina Timber & Lumber
Co., 111 N.C. 547,552-54,16 S.E. 692, 692-93 (1892).
76. See Act of Feb. 1, 1887, ch. 46, §§ 1-2, 1887 N.C. Sess. Laws 97, 97. Although the
1887 legislation authorized cartways for railroads and trams used to remove timber, that
part of the statute was held unconstitutional in Cozard v. Hardwood Co., 139 N.C. 283,
295, 51 S.E. 932, 936 (1905).
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factors. One was statutory: any cartway for removing timber could
be established for a period of no longer than five years. ' Therefore,
the burden was temporary. The temporal limitation may have
represented a legislative balancing of both the burden imposed on an
unwilling landowner and what would be a reasonable time to harvest
a stand of timber. Second, in all likelihood, many such cartways
would be in more remote, less populated areas. In such
circumstances the cartway might have minimal adverse effects on a
burdened landowner's privacy and tranquillity.78  In addition, the
number of situations in which a cartway was imposed unwillingly on
a landowner would be limited by the very fact that the person
seeking the cartway for purposes of harvesting timber had to lack
access, by an existing easement, to either a public road or to a river
capable of floating logs."
As the economy of the state changed and matured, additional
economic uses of land were included in the cartway statute. Mining
was added in 1917 and manufacturing in 1921.80 In both of these
instances, as in the case of timber harvesting, the traffic and noise
burden imposed on an unwilling landowner is potentially significant;
however, the number of occasions in which mines are being opened
or industrial or manufacturing operations are sited on parcels lacking
access to public roads is likely to be small.8 On the other hand, the
economic benefits to the community and state as a whole are likely
77. See Act of Feb. 1, 1887, ch. 46, §§ 1-2, 1887 N.C. Sess. Laws at 97. By 1931, the
statute had been modified to provide that "cartways ... for the removal of timber shall
automatically terminate at the end of a period of five years, unless a greater time is set
forth in the petition and the Judgment establishing the same." Act of May 27, 1931, ch. 448,
§ 1, 1931 N.C. Sess. Laws 760,761 (emphasis added).
78. Although the 1887 Act permitted the establishment of a cartway for railroads and
trams for the removal of timber, which would be more disturbing to peace and tranquillity,
that aspect of the Act was declared unconstitutional in 1905. See Cozard, 139 N.C. at 295,
51 S.E. at 936; supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (discussing Cozard).
79. See Act of Feb. 1, 1887, ch. 46, § 1, 1887 N.C. Sess. Laws at 97. The 1887 Act
changed the applicable language to "land to which there is leading no public road, or which
is not convenient to water." Id.
80. See Act of Mar. 7, 1921, ch. 135, § 1, 1921 N.C. Sess. Laws 395, 395 (adding
manufacturing); Act of Mar. 6, 1917, ch. 187, § 1, 1917 N.C. Sess. Laws 338, 338 (including
mines).
81. Until the passage of the 1995 amendments to the cartway statute, subsequent
amendments addressed situations in which the burden imposed was not likely to be
burdensome and would arise infrequently. In 1931, necessary church roads could be
established in accordance with the existing cartway procedures. See Act of May 27, 1931,
ch. 448, § 1, 1931 N.C. Sess. Laws at 761. The 1961 amendments added public or private
cemeteries to the list of permissible land uses. See Act of Mar. 21, 1961, ch. 71, § 1, 1961
N.C. Sess. Laws 88,88.
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to be substantial. In such circumstances, allowing the use of eminent
domain powers by a private party when a satisfactory private
accommodation cannot be reached seems to be a reasonable
legislative judgment.
The question is whether the 1995 addition of use of the land as a
"family homestead... [consisting] of at least seven acres" necessarily
represented the same reasonable legislative judgment.' Although
the acreage requirement drastically limits the instances in which a
person's use of the land would qualify for a cartway, there is a
serious question as to whether the use of land as a "family
homestead ... [consisting] of at least seven acres" is the type of land
use that represents a significant enough state interest to justify
allowing a private party, who might otherwise be foreclosed from
making such a use of the land due to the unwillingness of neighbors
to grant her or him an easement, to use the eminent domain powers
of the state to force a sale of the desired way. Such homesteads do
not provide the economic benefits to the community that cultivating
land, timbering, mining, and manufacturing do. Although the state
and the country have long encouraged homeownership, a policy
favoring homesteads of seven acres or more is unlikely to benefit
very many other than the wealthy.
This argument, however, suggests only that the 1995 legislation
may have been too narrowly drawn. It suggests that perhaps the
legislature should have permitted a petition for a cartway for a tract
of any size used as a "single-family residence" or, even more broadly,
for "any residential purposes." However, as a matter of policy, both
of these options have serious flaws. First, there is the question of the
degree to which the state wishes to encourage conversion of
farmland to residential subdivisions and apartment complexes on
homesites on wooded mountainsides and ridges.' Second, the
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(a) (Supp. 1996).
83. Preservation of farmland is both a national and state concern. "[U]rban
development is consuming 50 acres of prime and unique farmland every hour of every
day." Larry Williams, Study Finds 50 Acres Lost Every Hour, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 21, 1997, at A4. Between 1982 and 1992, North Carolina was second
in the nation in losses of prime farmland. See id. A national farm preservation group
ranked the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill area as the "fifth-most endangered agricultural
area in the country." Kelly Thompson Cochran, For the Good of Saving the Farm, NEVS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 7, 1997, at B1. Recently, a bill was introduced in the
North Carolina Senate to provide cash incentives to induce landowners to preserve their
land. See Andrew Guy, Jr., Bill Would Encourage Preservation, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 22,1997, at B5.
The state's concern about development of mountain ridges is reflected in the
Mountain Ridge Protection Act of 1983. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-205 to -214 (1994).
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amendment of the cartway statute to include single-family residences
or residential purposes would represent a significant expansion of
the cartway statute. The flow of population into the state8 has
brought a boom in construction of residential subdivisions and
apartment complexes. It is a boom that will continue for some time
into the future.' It is not unreasonable to assume that the carving
up, for subdivision or apartment uses, of large tracts of land
traditionally used for farming or timbering may result in such land
being left without access to a public road. 6 No longer would the
If the state is concerned about the loss of agricultural land to urban and suburban
development or the adverse effect of development in the mountains of the western part of
the state, it would seem that a more liberal cartway statute would be inconsistent with
those concerns.
84. See James Rosen, Triangle's Boom Likely to Continue, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), May 31,1996, at Al.
85. North Carolina's population is expected to surpass seven million by the year 2000.
See Elizabeth Wellington, Growth Driving Communities to Seek Incorporation, NEWs &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30, 1997, at Bi; see also supra note 83 (discussing loss of
farmland to development).
86. The reason that this lack of access is likely to occur is due to both the changing
nature of development in North Carolina and a history in which the availability of access
to land was generally not viewed as a matter of concern. In the early history of the state,
most land was used for farming. In the mountains, the good land was the lower land along
the river, not the rocky, craggy, higher mountain land. The upper land might be bought
and sold with little consideration given to whether there was access to a public road. In
addition, most people probably were not concerned about neighbors and others crossing
some portion of their land to get to other land and places. Neither people nor title
companies, until recently, thought very much about whether the people using a road that
crossed another's land had a legal right to do so. They knew that for many years a road
had been there and that everybody used it. In fact, the existence or absence of access
rights might not even be examined as part of a title search. Telephone Interview with
1illard Mount, General Counsel for Investors Title Insurance Co. (Apr. 7,1997).
But the changing nature of development and land acquisition financing has brought
the problem of the existence of legal access to the forefront. If the road being used was a
permissive way, then the legal owner of the land it crossed could revoke permission at any
time. Id.
If development is proposed to which a person objects, such as a hog farm or large
subdivision with lots of traffic, and if the existing permissive access is over the objecting
person's land, then the permission is likely to be revoked. In addition, in past years
lenders were not concerned with access rights. Most loans were given by local banks, and
they, like everyone else in the community, knew that there had always been a road used to
get to a particular parcel. Whether the use of the road was permissive or of right did not
trouble them. Today, however, loan packages are bought and sold on a national scale,
subject to federal insurance requirements, and the existence or lack of a legal means of
access, which is fundamental to the value of the land mortgaged as security for a loan, is of
critical importance. Id.
Thirty years ago, title insurance companies did not insure the existence of a legal
means of access to property subject to a title insurance policy. Today, a title insurance
policy and assurance of a legal means of access are central features of the loan package to
ensure the marketability of the loans in the secondary loan market. Consequently, the
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private use of eminent domain power by a private party be a
relatively rare instance. Instead, it likely would be more
commonplace for developers to use, or threaten to use, the power of
eminent domain to force neighboring landowners, who might well
have legitimate objections to the amount and type of traffic, to
provide them and their development project with a way across
neighboring land. Such potential widespread or threatened usage of
the powers of the state raises significant questions about the wisdom
of expanding a statute that historically has been tailored to limit its
impact upon the legitimate private property rights of neighboring
landowners. Third, we are no longer in a state in which the lack of
public funds makes it necessary to encourage private individuals to
construct quasi-public roads in order to connect the people of the
state and to move goods and produce.
The expansion of the cartway statute to encompass any
legitimate personal, business, or charitable activity is even more
troublesome. A justification of such an expansion is the "general
legislative policy favoring the practical use of property and its natural
resources which otherwise could not be put to such use for lack of
road access."' Although this statement represents a correct
existence or non-existence of a legal means of access to a parcel of land must be examined
as part of the title search, and without a determination that such legal access exists, the
loan will not be extended. Problems with access are of continuing concern to lenders, title
insurance companies, and title searchers. Id.
It is true that, theoretically, most landlocked land has an easement by necessity to
reach the nearest public road, but because of the absence of old documents and records,
proving the existence of the easement may be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.
See, e.g., BRUCE & ELY, supra note 2, 4.02[4] (noting that proof of unity of title may be
difficult to establish); 1 JAMES A WEBSTER, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA § 15-12, at 603 (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin eds., 4th
ed. 1994) ("[A] devisee of land cannot establish a way of necessity over the lands of other
devisees even though the land devised to him has no access to a public road."); see also
infra note 95 (discussing easements of necessity).
After sending a copy of a draft of this article to North Carolina State Senator
Hamilton C. Horton, Jr. of Winston-Salem, the authors received a letter in which Senator
Horton stated that: "While the subject [of cartway law] would appear to be arcane, the
truth of it is that it comes up more and more frequently in our law practice." Letter from
Senator Hamilton C. Horton, Jr., North Carolina State Senate, to Professors Joseph J.
Kalo and Monica Kivel Kalo (Apr. 22,1997) (on file with authors).
87. Turlington v. McLeod (Turlington I1), 323 N.C. 591, 597, 374 S.E.2d 394, 399
(1988). This statement in Turlington, however, was made in the context of whether the
courts should broadly or narrowly construe the meaning of the terms designating the types
of uses that could justify a cartway petition. In fact, the history of the North Carolina
cartway statute is one of selecting, over time, specific types of uses that would justify use
of the state's power of eminent domain. See id. at 597, 374 S.E.2d at 399; see also Land
Policy Act of 1974, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-150 to -159 (1994) (providing land-use
policy to guide governmental decision-making). One policy component of the Land Policy
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statement of a general policy, it does not address the question of
whether the legislative policy is to favor any legitimate practical use
of land. In fact, the history of the cartway statute indicates that the
legislature, while favoring the practical use of land, has determined
that only some potential uses justify state interference in negotiations
among neighboring landowners over the granting of access rights.'
If a use is not listed in the statute, that does not mean that there is no
practical use for land lacking access to a public road. The land and a
cartway are still available for the specific uses identified in the
statute. Other uses of the land are left to the give-and-take of private
negotiations among neighboring landowners.
Together with the "necessary, reasonable and just"' provision,
the use requirement of the cartway statute gives some important
negotiation leverage to a person over whose land a cartway could be
imposed. It is important to remember that once established, a
cartway is a public road, the use of which is not restricted to just the
use that provided the ground for invoking the statute and
establishing the cartway. As a public road, it may be used for any
legitimate purpose for which any public road may be used."0 If a
Act is "to encourage beneficial economic development." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-151(b).
However, it should be noted that the purpose of the Act is that it will "serve as a guide for
decision-making in State and federally assisted programs which affect land use, and shall
provide a framework for the development of land-use policies and programs by local
governments." Id. (emphasis added). The policy does not address the question of under
what circumstances the private parties should be permitted to use the power of the state to
impose the consequences of a particular type of economic development upon neighboring
landowners.
88. See Lea v. Johnson, 31 N.C. 15, 18-19 (1848) (noting that cartways are available
only in those limited circumstances set forth in the legislation). Although over the years
the cartway statute has been amended several times "to provide access for additional types
of uses of otherwise inaccessible property," Turlington II, 323 N.C. at 597, 374 S.E.2d at
399, the availability of a cartway is still limited to those persons who can establish that the
use of the otherwise inaccessible land is for one of the purposes identified in the statute.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(a) (Supp. 1996). However, in recent years the North
Carolina Supreme Court has broadly construed the nature of the uses included within the
statute. See, e.g., Turlington 11, 323 N.C. at 598,374 S.E.2d at 399 (cutting and removing of
timber for firewood that was occasionally sold to customers qualified as cutting and
removal of standing timber); Candler v. Sluder, 259 N.C. 62, 65-66, 130 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1963)
(discussing how cultivation includes the gathering of any crop, including the harvesting of
apples, which were not sold commercially but harvested for family and friends).
89. See infra notes 99-144 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Candler, 259 N.C. at 65, 69, 130 S.E.2d at 3,6 (holding that petitioner was
entitled to a cartway because he was engaged in cultivation, even though the cartway was
also being used by hunters renting a cabin from the petitioner); Yount v. Lowe, 24 N.C.
App. 48,51,209 S.E.2d 867,869 (1974) (noting that once a cartway is acquired, its uses are
not limited), aft'd, 288 N.C. 90,215 S.E.2d 563 (1975); see also 1 WEBSTER, supra note 86,
§ 15-19, at 632 ("Once a legitimate purpose for the establishment of a cartway is
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landowner is confronted with a situation in which the person seeking
a cartway meets the statute's use requirement but also intends to
engage in a non-qualifying use to which the landowner objects, the
appropriate strategy for the objecting landowner may be to offer a
grant of an express easement, the use of which would have a scope
limited to only those uses of land that qualify under the cartway
statute.91 Such an offer should preclude the imposition of a cartway
over the objecting party's land, since a cartway would no longer be
needed to provide access to the land in order to make a statutorily
acceptable use of it.'
If the legislature expands the application to other uses, perhaps
as broad as any legitimate business, personal, or charitable use, then
it will place considerable power in the hands of the person who
wants a cartway. Such a person would have less incentive to engage
in constructive, private negotiations directed at meeting legitimate
concerns of neighboring landowners. If any legitimate use is an
acceptable basis for a cartway petition, the person seeking access
could confront the neighboring landowers with almost a "take it or
leave it" situation, dictating the terms of any private agreement with
the threat that the person seeking the cartway can always go to court
and get it anyway.
The most troubling scenario, of course, is one in which a house
or business not qualifying for a cartway is placed on land under a
good faith but mistaken belief that a permanent, non-permissive
means of access to a public road exists.3 In the abstract, allowing a
person in this situation to petition for a cartway would seem to be
reasonable; however, upon closer examination, there are good
reasons not to amend the cartway statute to accommodate even such
a case. First, it would be difficult to craft an amendment narrowly
enough to encompass only such hardship cases.' Second, as
determined, the cartway that is laid off may be used for purposes other than those set forth
in the statute.").
91. Thus, in McLeod, the objecting parties should have offered the petitioner an
express easement for the removal of standing timber.
92. Cf. Taylor v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 262 N.C. 452, 457, 130 S.E.2d 833,
836 (1964) (denying the petition for a cartway partly because the court found that the
respondent's offer of an alternative express easement provided petitioner with another
adequate means of ingress and egress for removal of his timber).
93. A purchaser of land may believe that an existing way, such as a farm road or dirt
road, is permanent and intended to provide access to a public road. However, the fact may
be that no express easement exists and an implied easement cannot be proven. See infra
note 95.
94. If the legislature chose to address the hardship situation, it should limit the
availability of a cartway to those situations in which someone has constructed a residence
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compelling as such hardship cases may appear on their face, in the
absence of evidence that this problem is common, there is little
justification for any change broadening the statute that might
increase the overall instances in which unwilling landowners may be
burdened by cartways. Third, in many of these cases, the hardship
could be eliminated through more traditional common-law remedies.
For example, if a landlocked parcel is carved out of another parcel
that retains access to a public road, the owner of the landlocked
parcel probably can claim an easement based on common-law
principles such as prescription, necessity, or prior usage over the
original larger parcel.5 The landowner in such situations might
on a parcel of land to which access existed but for some reason the way of access is either
terminated or otherwise found not to be legally enforceable. This limitation would not
allow someone to obtain a cartway for the purpose of constructing a residence on as yet
undeveloped land. The amendment might provide that "having a homestead" would be a
qualifying use under the cartway statute. This approach would not solve all possible
hardship cases because it would not cover homesteads under construction, but then it is
difficult to craft an amendment that does so without extending the scope of the cartway
statute beyond the hardship case.
The suggested amendment would be consistent with the earlier versions of the
cartway statute-those that existed between 1798 and 1921. Prior to 1921, the cartway
statute required that, except for owning standing timber, the person claiming the right to a
cartway be presently on the land. See Act of 1798, ch. 26, preamble, 1798 N.C. Sess. Laws
126, 126 (protecting access to land upon which "persons settle"); CODE OF N.C., ch. 104,
§ 33 (recorded in REVISED STATUTES OF N.C. vol. I, 1836-37) (providing that protected
parties must "be settled upon or cultivating any land"); Act of Mar. 6, 1917, ch. 187, § 1,
1917 N.C. Sess. Laws 338, 338 (providing that protected parties must "be working any
mines or minerals"). In 1921, the legislature for the first time included language that
allowed establishment of a cartway for the purpose of being able to engage in an activity
on the land in the future. See Act of Mar. 7, 1921, ch. 135, § 1, 1921 N.C. Sess. Laws 395,
395. In 1921, the cartway statute was amended by adding "or be conducting or operating
any industrial or manufacturing establishment or plant, or taking action looking to the
erection, equipment, and operation of any such establishment or plant." Id. (emphasis
added). Subsequently, in 1931, the scope of the statute was broadened by amending it to
read: "or taking action preparatory to the operation of any such enterprises." Act of May
27, 1931, ch. 448, § 1, 1931 N.C. Sess. Laws 760, 760 (emphasis added). The "any such
enterprises" language refers back to all other uses mentioned in the statute and not just
manufacturing establishments or plants.
95. When a tract of land is severed into two or more parcels, and one or more parcels
are landlocked-that is, lack access to a public road-generally an easement by necessity
will exist from the landlocked parcel over the other parcel in order to allow access to a
public road. See 1 WEBSTER, supra note 86, § 15-12, at 602; see also BRUCE & ELY, supra
note 2, 4.02[1], [2] (explaining easements of necessity and listing the requirements for
the existence of such an easement). However, there is some law in North Carolina that
easements by necessity will not be implied in favor of the grantor. See 1 WEBSTER, supra
note 86, § 15-12(a), at 606. Also, "[c]ommon-law easements of necessity do not fully
resolve the problem of landlocked property because such servitudes arise only in limited
circumstances. The owner of an isolated parcel frequently cannot establish all the
requisite elements. Unity of title often is the sticking point." BRUCE & ELY, supra note 2,
4.02[4].
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prefer to have the right to a statutory cartway, since such a
proceeding might be considerably less expensive and time-consuming
than obtaining the evidence necessary to establish the existence of
some common law easement;" however, this does not constitute an
adequate basis to permit the imposition of a cartway on neighboring
lands not part of the parcel out of which the landlocked property was
carved. Similarly, the fact that a cartway over neighboring lands
would be more convenient than any easement that might be
established should not be sufficient justification of such a use of the
power of eminent domain.' Finally, in situations in which a
It also is possible that the grantee of a landlocked parcel may have an easement based
on prior usage across her grantor's land. However, the decision of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals in Tower Development Partners v. Zell, 120 N.C. App. 136, 461 S.E.2d 17
(1995), requires that, prior to severance of the tract, the prior usage must "have been 'so
... long continued as to show it was meant to be permanent.'" Id. at 144, 461 S.E.2d at 23
(quoting Hodges v. Winchester, 86 N.C. App. 473, 475, 358 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1987)). The
court stated that in prior case law "the shortest time heretofore recognized as sufficient to
imply an easement is thirteen years." Id. This requirement of long prior usage may pose
difficulties in establishing the existence of an easement based on prior usage.
The long usage of a roadway across another's land can result in the establishment of a
prescriptive easement, though a person claiming the existence of such an easement needs
to establish that her use of the roadway was adverse; and, in North Carolina, every use of a
way over another's land is presumed to be permissive until the contrary is shown. See 1
WEBSTER, supra note 86, § 15-17(a), at 620. Other requirements of prescriptive
easements also may pose proof problems. See id §§ 15-17, 15-17(b) to -17(f), at 617-19,
621-28.
96. Cf. Pritchard v. Scott, 254 N.C. 277, 281, 118 S.E.2d 890, 894 (1961) (illustrating
how a petitioner may be able to avoid having to obtain evidence). In Pritchard, the
petitioner attempted to condemn a statutory cartway over defendant's land rather than
litigating the issue of whether she had an easement by necessity over the land out of which
her tract was carved. See id. at 278-80, 118 S.E.2d at 891-93. According to the court, since
the defendant contended that petitioner had an easement by necessity over the land out of
which her tract was carved, the burden of proving the existence of the easement by
necessity was on the defendants. See id. at 281, 118 S.E.2d at 894. Thus, another
advantage to pursuing a statutory cartway is that the petitioner can effectively shift to the
defendant, the objecting party, the costs and burden of proving the existence of some other
way of access from the petitioner's land to a public road. If the defendant's evidence is
insufficient, the petitioner has a statutory cartway; if the evidence proves the right of
petitioner to some other common law easement, then the petitioner may pursue that claim
having the benefit of the defendant's efforts. Under such circumstances, the petitioner
does not have anything to lose in initially pursuing the statutory cartway alternative.
97. Cf. Lea v. Johnson, 31 N.C. 15,19 (1848) (noting that legislation, not convenience,
determined when a cartway would be imposed). Lea was the first case decided by the
North Carolina Supreme Court that involved the application of the cartway statute. In
Lea, the petitioner sought a cartway across the defendant's land because the existing
public roads required that people coming to his mill take a long, circuitous route. The
cartway, according to the petitioner, would be a "great convenience to [him and] ... the
neighborhood generally." Id. at 16. The supreme court rejected the petitioner's argument
on the basis that convenience to the petitioner and the general community was not a basis
under which a statutory cartway could be obtained. See id. at 18-19. The court stated that,
common-law easement does not exist, the landlocked owner may be
able to purchase a right of way across neighboring lands. Such a
negotiated purchase may be more expensive than a cartway
proceeding or may result in a less convenient route, but again, those
are not adequate bases to impose a cartway upon lands and people
not responsible for the creation of a landlocked parcel or to excuse
the insufficiency or failure of an adequate title search to determine
whether access to the parcel existed." Today, when most landowners
are protected by title insurance, the costs of a negotiated purchase or
the financial consequences of a lack of access will be borne by title
insurance companies. To broaden the statute to allow cartways to be
imposed more frequently upon the lands of innocent third parties in
order to reduce the exposure of title insurance companies would not
seem to be in the general public interest. Thus, the General
Assembly should be very cautious about any broadening of the uses
that would qualify for the imposition of a cartway.
III. WHEN IS IMPOSITION OF A CARTWAY "NECESSARY,
REASONABLE AND JUST"?
A person seeking a cartway must establish not only that the use
or planned use of the tract in question is one enumerated in the
statute, but also that the tract is one "to which there is leading no
public road, or other adequate means of transportation, other than a
navigable waterway, affording necessary and proper means of ingress
thereto and egress therefrom."" Even satisfaction of this
requirement, however, may not guarantee success in light of an
additional requirement that has remained unchanged since 1854,"
that the petitioner also satisfy the court that it is "necessary,
reasonable and just" that the cartway be imposed. 0' In fact, as will
be discussed, an examination of North Carolina caselaw reveals that
the "necessary, reasonable and just" requirement is significant and
in the absence of statutory authorization, "individuals must be left to depend upon the
courtesy of good neighborship or the acquisition, by grant, of the right of private ways."
Id. at 19.
98. Cf. Pritchard, 254 N.C. at 286,118 S.E.2d at 897 (holding that petitioner, a devisee
of one part of a larger tract that had been owned by the grantor, could not obtain a
cartway over a neighboring parcel when the owner of that parcel was a "stranger to the
tifle" of the grantor's original tract). For a discussion of Pritchard, see infra notes 129-33
and accompanying text. See also supra note 96 (discussing how Pritchard illustrates that a
cartway petitioner may be able to avoid having to obtain evidence).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(a) (Supp. 1996).
100. See CODE OF N.C., ch. 101, § 37 (recorded in REvISED CODE OF N.C., Moore-
Biggs 1854).
101. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(a).
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indeed often determinative, rather than mere surplusage.
Necessity, the first aspect of the requirement, is well established.
Numerous cases have recited the rule that a cartway is not to be
established merely because it would provide a means of ingress or
egress that would be more convenient or economical than one to
which the petitioner is already entitled."° If the petitioner has a right
of way that would provide reasonable and adequate access to a
public road, the petitioner is not entitled to a cartway "whether he
obtained his right or rights of way by grant, prescription, or the mere
operation of law."1" Thus, historically, when a petition for a cartway
is filed, the landowner over whose property a cartway is being sought
has been able to assert as an affirmative defense that the petitioner is
already entitled to a right of way across the land of another and the
facts used to establish this assertion can consist of proof that the
petitioner's right is one premised on prescriptive use orimplication."°
The 1995 amendments appear intended to address the situation
of a landowner who may have an easement or right of way to a
public road that is premised on prescription or implication by
providing that a landowner who does not have a "deeded or
documented easement or right-of-way to a public road" is entitled to
institute a cartway proceeding." However, because the statute as
amended retained the traditional requirement that imposition of a
cartway must be shown to be "necessary, reasonable and just," the
question arises of whether this language was intended to mean that
the existence of a right of way premised on prescription or
implication becomes entirely irrelevant or whether an objecting
landowner could still assert the existence of such a right as an
affirmative defense which, if proven, will defeat the petitioner's right
to a cartway."'0
102. See, e.g., Warlick v. Lowman, 103 N.C. 122, 124, 9 S.E. 458, 459 (1889); Campbell
v. Connor, 77 N.C. App. 627, 629, 335 S.E.2d 788, 790 (1985), affd per curiam, 316 N.C.
548, 342 S.E.2d 391 (1986); Taylor v. Askew, 17 N.C. App. 620, 624, 195 S.E.2d 316, 319
(1973). But see Brown v. Mobley, 192 N.C. 470, 473-74, 135 S.E. 304, 305 (1926)
(permitting a new way to be established when the old way had became "practically
impassable or unreasonably inconvenient"). Brown was decided under the 1921
amendment to the cartway statute. See supra text accompanying note 67 (setting forth the
relevant language of the amendment).
103. Burgwynv. Lockhart, 60 N.C. 264,268 (1864).
104. See Pritchard v. Scott, 254 N.C. 277,281, 118 S.E.2d 890,893-94 (1961).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(a).
106. Although the burden of proof to support such an affirmative defense would be on
the party objecting to imposition of the cartway, if the defense is successful the party may
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Whatever the intended effect of the language relating to the
existence of an undocumented right of way, there would appear to be
little justification for allowing someone who has a right premised on
prescription or implication, even if heretofore unasserted, to burden
another person's land with a cartway. In fact, because a person
requesting a cartway must pay the compensation assessed, whereas a
right of way premised on prescription or implication does not require
payment of compensation to the owner of the servient tract,'07 the
question naturally arises of why a person entitled to such a fred right
of way would even want to acquire one under the cartway statute.
The most likely explanation appears to be that the right that could
be asserted on the basis of prescription or implication is not
satisfactory to the petitioner; however, if such a right of way is
"reasonable and adequate," then, under long-standing principles, the
petitioner should not be able to burden another's land with a
cartway merely on the basis that the cartway sought would provide a
means of ingress or egress that would be more convenient or
economical."
The 1995 amendments also appear intended to address the
situation of a landowner who has a means of access premised on
permission. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that a
petitioner is not entitled to a cartway if he has reasonable access
through a permissive right of way," even one that is "temporary in
nature, and may be withdrawn at some future time. 1 . The 1995
amendments provide that "[a] permissive use of a right-of-way or
easement across the land of another shall not be a bar to the
establishment of a cartway.""' Once again, however, what is not
clear is whether the intended effect of the amendment was to make
be able to recover some of the costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. Section 136-68,
the procedural cartway statute, incorporates Chapter 40A Eminent Domain "insofar as the
same is applicable and in harmony with the provisions of this section." Id. § 136-68. The
eminent domain statute provides that if the condemnor abandons the action or if the final
judgment in a condemnation action is that the condemnor is not authorized to condemn the
property, the court may "award each owner of the property sought to be condemned a sum
that... will reimburse the owner for:. his reasonable costs; disbursements; [and] expenses
(including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees)." Id. § 40A-8(b) (1984).
107. See Pritchard, 254 N.C. at 281, 118 S.E.2d at 893.
108. For a discussion of cases addressing this point, see supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
109. See Garris v. Byrd, 229 N.C. 343,345,49 S.E.2d 625, 626 (1948); see also Taylor v.
Askew, 17 N.C. App. 620, 622, 195 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1973) (noting that a desire to have a
shorter outlet to a public road is immaterial).
110. Turlington v. McLeod (Turlington 1), 79 N.C. App. 299, 305, 339 S.E.2d 44, 49
(1986).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(c).
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the existence of a permissive way entirely irrelevant in a
determination of whether the petitioner is entitled to a cartway or
whether it was merely intended to create a statutory presumption
that lack of a deeded or documented easement or right of way should
entitle a petitioner to a cartway."' Under the latter approach, a
permissive way would continue to be a bar to the establishment of a
cartway when it provides a reasonable and adequate means of
ingress and egress because under those circumstances the imposition
of a cartway would not be necessary, reasonable, and just."
Where, however, the means of ingress and egress is premised on
permission, rather than on prescription or implication, there may be
an additional consideration. If the right rests on permission that can
be rescinded at any time, then the right, although perhaps reasonable
and adequate with respect to location and the type of vehicular
traffic that can be accommodated, may not be "reasonable and
adequate" to permit the landowner to fully develop and utilize the
property. The owner of a tract whose only means of access is
permissive may not only be unwilling to commit his or her own
financial resources but may also be unable to convince outside
investors or financial institutions to commit financial resources under
such circumstances.'" Courts have characterized the cartway statutes
as reflecting "a general legislative policy favoring the practical use of
property and its natural resources."" In light of this policy and the
fact that the majority of qualifying uses enumerated in the statute
involve the expenditure of substantial sums-for example,
manufacturing or industrial plants-it might be reasonable to
consider amending the cartway statute to provide that the required
necessity exists and the imposition of a cartway is justified when the
petitioner's only means of access is a permissive one that is revocable
at will. Although such a change would somewhat broaden the
cartway statute, it would not undercut the effect of the "necessary,
112. The legislature created such a presumption in 1981 in response to a 1964 North
Carolina Supreme Court decision holding that access to a navigable river could be an
adequate means of access. See Taylor v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 262 N.C. 452,
456,137 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1964).
113. See Garis, 229 N.C. at 345,49 S.E.2d at 626.
114. In an analogous situation, grantees who had a permissive right of way over the
land of a neighbor were still held to be entitled to an implied easement by necessity on the
basis that their lack of a permanent and enforceable means of access to a public road made
it impossible for them to obtain a loan on the property to finance a home. See Wilson v.
Smith, 18 N.C. App. 414,418,197 S.E.2d 23,26 (1973).
115. Tarlington v. McLeod (Turlington I1), 323 N.C. 591, 597, 374 S.E.2d 394, 399
(1988).
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reasonable and just" requirement to encourage the person over
whose land a cartway is being sought to engage in constructive,
creative negotiation with the petitioner. If the petitioner is offered a
private right of way or easement subject to reasonable conditions
and on reasonable terms, then a petition for a statutory cartway
could still be denied as not being necessary, reasonable, and just.116
Necessity, although perhaps the best known, is merely one
aspect of the "necessary, reasonable and just" requirement. In a
1963 case, Candler v. Sluder,1 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court
stated:
We do not suggest that under the present statute it is not
required that petitioners satisfy the jury by the greater
weight of the evidence that the proposed cartway is
necessary, reasonable and just. There is no material
difference, however, in requiring petitioners to show they
have no "adequate means of transportation affording
necessary and proper means of ingress and egress" and in
requiring them to show that a cartway is "necessary,
reasonable and just." The difference is only in the
approach to the question-the former has a negative and
the latter an affirmative approach."'
This characterization by the court is clearly accurate in the sense
that a petitioner who has an adequate means of ingress and egress is
not entitled to a cartway, due to a failure to establish that one is
"necessary." However, an examination of other cartway cases
reveals that there are certain factual settings in which granting a
cartway would not be necessary, reasonable, and just even though
the petitioner established the lack of an adequate means of ingress
and egress. For example, in Campbell v. Connor," decided in 1985,
the petitioner's tract contained one hundred feet of frontage on a
public road. The petitioner admitted the existence of an alternate
116. See, e.g., Taylor, 262 N.C. at 457, 130 S.E.2d at 836-37 (denying the petition for a
cartway on the basis of a failure to establish that it was necessary, reasonable, and just, not
only because the petitioner had access to a navigable stream but also because the court
found that the respondent's offer of an easement provided the petitioner with another
adequate means of ingress and egress for the removal of his timber); see also Tarlington v.
McLeod (Turlington 1), 79 N.C. App. 299,305-06,339 S.E.2d 44, 48-49 (1986) (noting that
if petitioner has permissive way, even if permission is temporary, then petition for cartway
may be denied).
117. 259 N.C. 62,130 S.E.2d 1 (1963).
118. Id. at 68,130 S.E.2d at 6.
119. 77 N.C. App. 627, 335 S.E.2d 788 (1985), affd per curiam, 316 N.C. 548, 342
S.E.2d 391 (1986).
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outlet to a public road but asserted that he was nonetheless entitled
to a cartway because the topography of the terrain rendered the
alternate outlet inadequate." The petitioner did not, however,
introduce any evidence as to the unfeasibility of modifying the
terrain to create an adequate means of access. In holding that the
petitioner was not entitled to a cartway in the absence of such
proof," the court noted that in order to be entitled to a cartway a
petitioner must prove three things:
(1) the land in question is used for one of the purposes
enumerated in the statute, (2) the land is without adequate
access to a public road or other adequate means of
transportation affording necessary and proper ingress and
egress, and (3) the granting of a private way over the lands
of other persons is necessary, reasonable and just."
In some cases, application of the "necessary, reasonable and
just" requirement has centered primarily on the fact that the
petitioner was requesting that a cartway be imposed over the land of
a "stranger" when an adequate means of access could be provided
across the land of someone to whom he was connected. In Burwell v.
Sneed,m a tenant whose leasehold did not abut a public road filed a
petition to establish a cartway across the lands of strangers despite
the fact that his landlord owned adjacent property that could provide
an adequate, although longer and less convenient, means of reaching
a public road.' After stating that "[w]hether it is necessary,
reasonable and just that a particular cartway shall be allowed
involves facts plain and simple in their nature and application that
120. See id. at 630,335 S.E.2d at 790.
121. See id. at 630-31,335 S.E.2d at 790.
122. See id. at 631,335 S.E.2d at 790. On the other hand, where such proof exists, there
are situations in which it is necessary, reasonable, and just to establish a cartway for a user
of a single tract of land even when there is a public road abutting a part of the tract. The
facts in Mayo v. Thigpen, 107 N.C. 63, 11 S.E. 1052 (1890), presented the court with such a
situation. In Mayo, the petitioner owned two adjacent tracts of land, one of which was
occupied by a tenant. See id. at 64-65,11 S.E. at 1052. The larger of the two tracts abutted
a public road, but the other did not. See id. The two tracts were connected by a narrow
strip that the petitioner owned but that was allegedly unfit for access due to the number
and size of ditches to be crossed and the fact that it was constantly subject to overflow. See
ia. at 65, 11 S.E.,at 1052. Over the dissent of one justice, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the petitioner was not precluded from having a cartway established in such
circumstances since the existing connection between his two parcels was sufficiently
proved to constitute an impracticable means of access. See id. at 65-66,11 S.E. at 1052-53.
123. Campbell, 77 N.C. App. at 629,335 S.E.2d at 789-90.
124. 104 N.C. 118,10 S.E. 152 (1889).
125. See id. at 119,10 S.E. at 152.
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ordinary jurymen readily understand and appreciate,"'12 6 the court
upheld the jury finding that under the circumstances "it was not
'necessary, reasonable and just that the cartway should be laid out
over the lands of the defendant.' ,,. Clearly the jury perceived that
it would not be "reasonable" or "just" to burden the land of a
neighboring landowner simply because it could provide the
petitioner with a more convenient route to a public road. Similarly,
the right to a cartway over an adjoining property owner's tract has
been denied when the petitioner could obtain access to a public road
by laying drainage tiles over another adjacent tract owned by the
county."z
Not too dissimilar is the situation in which title to a parcel of
land has been divided in such a manner as to leave one party without
access to a public road. In one such case, Pritchard v Scott," the
owner of a tract of land devised one portion to his wife and the other
to his son by a prior marriage. The portion devised to his wife did
not abut a public road, but the portion devised to his son did." The
wife then filed a petition for a cartway alleging that it was necessary,
reasonable, and just that she have a cartway over the lands of some
one or more adjoining property owners." One of the respondents
asserted as an affirmative defense that the petitioner was not entitled
to a cartway over his land because she had a legal right to an implied
easement (way of necessity) over the land of her co-devisee that
would provide an adequate means of access to a public road."2 After
126. Id. at 120,10 S.E. at 152.
127. Id. at 119, 122, 10 S.E. at 152, 153 (quoting the jury verdict). In Burwell, both the
landlord and tenant joined in the petition seeking the cartway. See id. at 118, 10 S.E. at
152. In addition to evidence that tended to show that the tenant could reach a public road
by passing over the landlord's remaining land (although such a route was longer and less
convenient), according to the court there was also evidence that the landlord actually had
placed the tenant on the smaller tract in order to enable the landlord to obtain the cartway
for his own convenience. See id. at 120-21,10 S.E. at 152.
128. See Taylor v. Askew, 17 N.C. App. 620,623-24,195 S.E.2d 316,318-19 (1973).
129. 254 N.C. 277,118 S.E.2d 890 (1961).
130. See id. at 278,118 S.E.2d at 891.
131. See id. at 278, 118 S.E.2d at 892. Although the petitioner in Pritchard did join a
number of adjoining landowners, including her co-devisee, in her petition, the facts of the
case raise a related issue: Should the petitioner have to join all adjacent property owners
even though petitioner is seeking a cartway over the land of just one of the adjacent
owners? Joining all adjacent owners would allow the finder of fact to determine over
which parcel a cartway might most reasonably be established. Present procedure allows
the petitioner to select the potentially subject parcel by selecting the defendant, leaving
the defendant to argue that a way over the land of non-parties is more suitable and thus a
way over the defendant's land is not necessary, reasonable, and just.
132. See id. at 279,118 S.E.2d at 892.
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finding that the respondent had established the facts necessary to
support this allegation, the court held that, under such circumstances,
"[c]ommon fairness, as well as strict statutory construction, impels
the conclusion that petitioner has no right to condemn a cartway
over the land of strangers to the title."' In most situations in which
severance of title results in one party being left without access to a
public road, the right to an implied easement by necessity should
exist.' And, even if an implied easement by necessity does not
exist, 5 it would not be necessary, reasonable, and just in most
circumstances to allow the owner of the landlocked portion to
acquire a cartway over the land of a stranger. The correct result
would be to require the landlocked owner to petition for a cartway
over the other portion of the severed parcel on the basis that the
burden of a cartway should be on one of the parties to the
transaction that resulted in the parcel's being left without access to a
public road.
Embodied in the "necessary, reasonable and just" requirement
is the notion that the forced intrusion upon the use of another's land
should be the minimum needed to accomplish the governmental
objective of providing reasonable access. This notion arguably
affects the determination of both the actual location of the cartway
and how long the forced intrusion will last. The exact location of the
cartway is to be determined by a "jury of view" appointed by the
133. Id. at 286,118 S.E.2d at 897.
134. In North Carolina, the requirements for an implied easement of necessity are "(1)
a conveyance (2) of a portion of the grantor's land.., and (3) after this severance of the
two portions or parcels, it is necessary for the grantee to have an easement over the
grantor's retained land to reach a public road." 1 WEBSTER, supra note 86, § 15-12, at 603
(footnote omitted).
135. See White v. Coghill, 201 N.C. 421,423-24,160 S.E. 472,473 (1931) (holding that a
devisee of land could not establish an implied way of necessity over the lands of other
devisees even though the portion of the tract devised to him had no access to a public
road). Professor Glenn characterizes White v. Coghill as "clearly the worst North Carolina
implied easement opinion" and cites several noted authorities in stating that "[t]he notion
that a devise cannot form the basis for an easement by necessity is not accepted by the
major text writers." Peter G. Glenn, Implied Easements in the North Carolina Courts: An
Essay on the Meaning of "Necessary," 58 N.C. L. REV. 223,240 & n.83 (1980). In addition,
Professor Glenn points out that the court's decision in Pritchard v. Scott
was based on reasoning that required an implicit acceptance of the possibility
that a devisee can acquire an easement by necessity across the lands of another
devisee. For these reasons it seems unlikely that White can be fairly read as
establishing the proposition that a devise will not establish the basis for an
easement by necessity.
1d. at 240-41 n.83.
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clerk of court. 6 The 1995 amendments provided that "[i]n
determining the path of a cartway ... the jury of view shall give
priority to the location of previously used easements or cartways."'3 7
Such a provision may be unwise and is, at the very least,
unnecessary. The rule is already well established that the jury of
view is to lay out the route of the cartway "in such a manner as might
be most convenient and proper for all the parties."'' Furthermore,
even in the absence of such a provision, the North Carolina Supreme
Court long ago held that
[i]n passing on the reasonableness and the necessity, as well
as the convenience of the new cartway sought to be laid out,
evidence as to the use of the old pathway, its convenience
and directness, was competent as tending to prove its utility
to the public. It would not be a violation of the statute, if
the jurors saw fit to do so, to lay out the new pathway over
the route of the old.39
Because the person seeking a cartway is the one responsible for
the expense associated with creating and maintaining it, the
petitioner may well want to have its location determined by an old or
existing roadway.1' And in considering the interests of the owner of
the land over which the cartway is to be laid, the existence of an old
136. See Triplett v. Lail, 227 N.C. 274,275,41 S.E.2d 755,756 (1947).
The order of the clerk ... fixes the right of petitioners to a way of ingress and
egress. The appointment of a jury of view, to locate, lay off, and mark the bounds
of the easement thus established, is the mechanics, in the nature of an execution,
provided for the enforcement of the order.
Id. Although the location of the cartway is the job of the jury of view, "its acts are
reviewable by the court." Taylor v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 262 N.C. 452, 456,
137 S.E.2d 834, 836 (1964) (citing Candler v. Sluder, 259 N.C. 62, 67, 130 S.E.2d 1, 5
(1963), and Garris v. Byrd, 229 N.C. 343,345, 49 S.E.2d 625, 626-27 (1948)).
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69(c) (Supp. 1996).
138. Burden v. Harman, 52 N.C. 354,356 (1860).
139. Barber v. Griffin, 158 N.C. 348, 350-51,74 S.E. 110, 111 (1912).
140. See Taylor, 262 N.C. at 454-55, 137 S.E.2d at 834-35. In Taylor, the petitioner
wanted to harvest timber on 1600 acres and asked that a cartway be established following
the track of a road constructed by respondent timber company that owned the surrounding
612,000 acres. See iU The petitioner argued that he was entitled to a cartway located on
the respondent's pre-existing road because it would be more economical than building his
own road. See id. The court rejected the petitioner's arguments, stating in part that
"[e]ven a petitioner qualifying... [for a cartway] over the lands of another is not entitled
to select his route or to use existing private roads on a respondent's land as a matter of
right, however expedient and economical their use would be to him." Id. at 456, 137
S.E.2d at 836. The court then noted that petitioner's use of the defendant's road would not
only increase both its maintenance and supervision costs but also that once the road was
established as a cartway it would become a quasi-public road open for use by others. See
id.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
or existing roadway may well prove to be the most reasonable
location for the cartway sought because it would constitute a lesser
burden than imposing a new one with a different route. This will
not, however, always be true. In such cases it should be left up to the
jury of view to weigh all the various factors in determining the most
reasonable location, and its discretion should not be fettered by
being forced to give "priority" to one factor at the expense of others.
With respect to the reasonableness of the duration of a cartway,
a statutory procedure for the discontinuance of a cartway has existed
since 1854.141 The basic thrust of such legislation is that, unlike the
situation in which the power of eminent domain is invoked by a state
agency to acquire land for a public highway, a cartway should exist
only so long as it serves the purpose for which it was established.142
Although it is true that the use of a cartway once established is not
limited to the use or uses that served as the basis for the cartway
petition,' such other uses standing alone should not be sufficient to
support the continuation of a cartway that no longer serves a
statutory purpose. Similarly, even if the statutory uses are still
present, if the benefited parcel subsequently becomes served by a
public road or acquires some other adequate means of access, a
petitioner should be able to have the cartway terminated as no
141. See CODE OF N.C., ch. 101, § 38 (recorded in REVISED CODE OF N.C., Moore-
Biggs 1854). The current statute provides that
[c]artways or other ways ... may be altered, changed, or abandoned in like
manner as herein provided for their establishment upon petition instituted by any
interested party. A cartway established under this Article shall not terminate
until the time specified in the petition and as found necessary and proper by the
court.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-70.
142. This idea was more explicit in the pre-1995 statute. For example, prior to 1995,
and since 1887, cartways for the removal of timber could not exist for more than five years
unless a greater period of time was specified in the judgment, the legislative presumption
being that this normally should be a reasonable period of time to accomplish the objective
of harvesting timber from landlocked parcels. The 1995 legislation removed the five-year
presumption, but if the effect of Section 4 of the 1995 legislation is to reinstate § 136-70 as
it existed prior to the 1995 amendments, the presumptive five-year period for cartways.
established for harvesting timber would come back into effect. And, since the language of
§ 136-70 refers to the alteration, changing, or abandonment of cartways in a "like manner
as herein provided for their establishment," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-70, that would appear
to mean that a cartway could be discontinued when a court determined it was necessary,
reasonable, and just. Arguably an attorney representing a respondent in a losing cartway
proceeding might consider asking the court to put explicit language in the judgment
specifying the duration of the established cartway.
143. See, e.g., Candler v. Sluder, 259 N.C. 62, 65, 69, 130 S.E.2d 1, 3, 6 (1963);
Turlington v. McLeod (Turlington 1), 79 N.C. App. 299, 302-04, 339 S.E.2d 44, 47-48
(1986).
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longer being "necessary, reasonable and just."' 44
IV. CONCLUSION
When future efforts are made to broaden the cartway statute,
the legislature should keep in mind the long history of confining its
application to a limited set of circumstances. Embodied within that
history is a delicate balancing of the sensible public policy of full
utilization of land and natural resources with a respect for the private
property and personal rights of individuals. Unlike the exercise of
eminent domain powers by public utilities and railroads, the exercise
of such power through cartway legislation poses the specter of the
state, in effect, taking one person's land for the use of another under
circumstances in which the person to be benefited simply may be
unwilling to engage in the necessary give-and-take of a negotiated
solution to his access problem. Not infrequently, one suspects, those
who rail the most against governmental interference with the lives
and activities of private persons are the same ones who lobby their
legislators for amendments to the cartway statute that would enable
them to use the power of the state to override the legitimate interests
and objections of their neighbors. Although the state may have the
constitutional power to enact much broader cartway legislation, it
may be a power that wisdom leaves unexercised.
144. See Plimmons v. Frisby, 60 N.C. 200, 201 (1864) (allowing termination of cartway
because there were several other roads leading to the land in question, all of which had
been used by the public for a number of years).
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